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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Petitioner-Appellant James Hairston (Hairston),

for the ﬁrst—degree

the

Judgment summarily dismissing the claims

successive

Amended Petition

Statement

Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings

The

has been sentenced t0 death

murders of William and Dalma Fuhriman in January 1996, appeals from

court’s

district

who

in Hairston’s

third

for Post-Conviction Relief (Amended Successive Petition).

facts leading to Hairston’s convictions for ﬁrst—degree

murder and robbery, and

sentence 0f death for the Fuhrimans’ murders, are summarized in State V. Hairston

(Hairston

I),

133 Idaho 496, 500-01, 988 P.2d 1170 (1999), as follows:

On

January

6,

1996, Hairston and a companion, Richard Klipfel,

were driving from Grand Junction, Colorado,

t0 Spokane, Washington.
Fuhrimans’ ranch because they had run out of money
and could not continue their journey. The Fuhrimans invited Hairston and

They stopped

at the

Klipfel into their

Fuhriman was
shot

him

home and

sitting at a

in the

offered t0 help

them ﬁnd

jobs.

While Mr.

kitchen table looking at a phone book, Hairston

head and then shot Mrs. Fuhriman. Hairston and Klipfel

took $30 in cash, credit cards, and some personal property from the
Fuhrimans’ home and continued their journey.
Hairston and Klipfel

pawned some 0f the Fuhrimans'

property.

They purchased

several items

With the credit cards including toy remote control cars, tires, food, gas, and
lodging. They also attempted to purchase a Harley Davidson motorcycle

and $2500 worth of snowboarding equipment, but the credit card was
Hairston and Klipfel were apprehended together near Clarkston,
Washington, three days after the murders.

rejected.

Hairston,

p.261),1

1

Who was

was found

Hairston was

(R., p.261.)

guilty

over

by

at the

time he committed the murders (R.,

a jury 0f two counts of ﬁrst-degree murder and one count of

and murdered the Fuhrimans on January

6,

1996.

robbery.

I_d.

at

501.

On September 6,

1996, after ﬁnding four statutory aggravating factors

and concluding the collective mitigation did not outweigh the four statutory aggravating
factors individually, the district court sentenced Hairston to death for both counts of ﬁrst-

degree murder, and ﬁxed

life for

Li

the robbery.

at 501,

509-10; (see also R., p.259).

After being sentenced, Hairston ﬁled his ﬁrst Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,

which the

district court denied.

Li.

In

August 1999,

in a consolidated appeal, this

afﬁrmed Hairston’s convictions, sentences, and denial of post-conviction
In June 2000, Hairston ﬁled a federal habeas petition,

Hairston V. State (“Hairston
petition

201

1,

II”),

relief.

Court

See

Q

Which remains pending. See

144 Idaho 5 1 54, 156 P.3d 552 (2007). While his federal
,

was pending, Hairston ﬁled

his ﬁrst successive post-conviction petition in

raising 21 claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

May

and one claim

involving the denial 0f resources stemming from the district court’s denial of a mitigation
expert that Hairston sought to hire for the purpose 0f showing brain damage. Li. Hairston

ﬁled his second successive post-conviction petition in August 2002, contending his death
sentence

was

unconstitutional as a result 0f Ring V. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002),

which concluded

statutory aggravating factors are the functional equivalent of elements of

a greater offense and, under the Sixth

144 Idaho

at 54.

Amendment, had t0 be found by a jury. Hairston

Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2719, the

district court

II,

dismissed the claims in both

successive petitions. Li. In another consolidated appeal, this Court afﬁrmed the denial of

post-conviction relief in both cases.

I_d.

at

56-59. Addressing the ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claims, this Court dismissed the claims because they

ﬁled under LC.

§ 19-2719.

also dismissed because

it

Li. at 57-58.

was

The claim regarding

raised in the ﬁrst appeal and

were not timely

the mitigation expert

known within the

was

statutory time

limits set

by LC.

§ 19-2719.

I_d.

at 58.

Hairston’s claims regarding R_ing.

On March

16,

I_d.

Based upon LC.
at

§

19-27 1 9, this Court also dismissed

58-592

2018, more than 21 years after he was sentenced and With the

assistance ofthe Federal Defender Services of Idaho, Hairston ﬁled a third successive Post-

Conviction Petition contending his death sentence

is

unconstitutional under the federal and

Idaho Constitutions because he was under twenty-one years 01d

Fuhrimans and because the

district court

V.

the

did not give adequate consideration to his being

under twenty-years 01d as allegedly required by Miller

and Montgomery

When he murdered

V.

Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016).

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012),
(R., pp.8-29.)

An Amended

Successive Petition was ﬁled raising the same two claims (R., pp.257-290) with 47 exhibits
(R., pp.292-703).3

Hairston speciﬁcally averred that his

being ﬁled pursuant t0 LC. §§ 19-2719 and 19-4901.
district court to take judicial notice

Amended Successive Petition was
(R., p.257.)

Hairston asked the

of the exhibits, only two 0f which were from his

underlying criminal case With the other exhibits taken from records in other murder cases

(R.,

pp.704-1

The

1),

Which the court granted (TL, pp.10-1

state

ﬁled an answer denying Hairston was entitled to post—conviction

and asserting the claims

in the

Amended

the consolidated appeal as required

2

1).4

by LC.

relief,

Successive Petition should have been raised in

§

19-4901(b) and that the

Amended

Successive

264 (2008), the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded Hairston II, but only as t0 the R_ing claim. Hairston V. Idaho, 552 U.S. 1227
(2008). Upon reconsideration, Hairston’s case was consolidated With several others, and
this Court afﬁrmed the district court, concluding that R_ing is not retroactive. Rhoades et
a1. V. State, 149 Idaho 130, 233 P.3d 61 (2010).
3
Hairston also ﬁled a Motion to Supplement his Amended Successive Petition With
additional exhibits (R., pp.742-56), which the district court granted (Tr., p.9).
4
Neither party sought judicial notice of any other records from Hairston’s underlying
criminal, initial post-conviction, 0r his two prior successive post-conviction cases.
In light of Danforth V. Minnesota, 552 U.S.

Petition

is

state also

Amended

barred by the statute 0f limitation in LC. § 19-4902(a).

Summary

ﬁled a Motion for

(R., pp.725-27.)

The

Dismissal and a supporting brief asking that the

Successive Petition be dismissed because the claims are time-barred,

it is

a

successive petition, and the claims were or could have been raised in prior proceedings.
(R., pp.728-36.)

Petition

is

Hairston responded speciﬁcally asserting his

governed by LC.

§ 19-2719, that the

Amended

Amended

Successive

Successive Petition was timely

ﬁled based upon sworn declarations attached as exhibits 45 and 46 to the Successive

Amended

Petition, that

he had overcome the successive petition bar 0f LC.

because his claims are “based on
could not have been

known

had not yet been issued

earlier

from emerging science and data

t0 dismiss the

Amended

because his claims

claims were not

“ﬂow from judicial

time 0f his most recent post-conviction

at the

At a hearing 0n the

new developments,” and his

that did not

state’s

come

§

to fruition until

19-2719(5)

known and

opinions that

litigation, as

2018.”

(R.,

motion, the prosecutor expressly asked the

Successive Petition based upon I.C. § 19-2719.

well as

pp.737-41 .)

district court

(T12, p.14.)

The

prosecutor asserted the two claims could have been raised at the time his ﬁrst postconviction petition
the time he

was

ﬁled, particularly since Hairston

murdered the Fuhrimans.

advisement (TL, p.30), the

no

district court

was obviously aware 0f his age

(TL, pp.14-16.)

at

After taking the matter under

denied post—conviction

relief,

concluding there

constitutional prohibition preventing imposition of the death penalty

is

0n murderers

between the ages 0f 1 8 and 2 1 and that the sentencing factors from Miller and Montgomery
,

apply only to murderers under the age 0f 18.

December
8,

7,

(R.,

pp.761-786).

Judgment was ﬁled

2018. (R., pp.787-88.) Hairston’s timely Notice of Appeal was ﬁled January

2019. (R., pp.789—94.)

ISSUES
Hairston has phrased the issues 0n appeal as follows:

A.

Whether Mr. Hairston’s death sentence is unconstitutional because
he was under twenty-one at the time of the offense.

B.

Whether Mr. Hairston’s death sentence

is

unconstitutional because

the mitigating factors associated With his youth

were not given

proper consideration.

(Brief, p.2.)

The
1.

state

Wishes t0 rephrase the issues on appeal as follows:

Has Dunlap waived the claims in his Amended Successive Petition because they
were known 0r reasonably could have been known When he ﬁled his ﬁrst postconviction petition, or were not timely ﬁled when they were known or reasonably
could have been known, which requires dismissal of his appeal?
Has Dunlap failed t0 establish the district court erred by summarily dismissing
Claim 1 of his Amended Successive Petition, which is based upon the contention
that the death penalty cannot be imposed upon murderers under the age 0f 21?
Has Dunlap failed t0 establish the district court erred by summarily dismissing
Claim 2 0f his Amended Successive Petition, Which is based upon the contention
that the requirements of Miller V. Alabama and Montgomery V. Louisiana, should
be extended to murderers between 18 and 21

who have been

sentenced to death?

ARGUMENT
I.

Were Known Or Reasonably Could Have Been Known When He Filed
And Even If Not Known At That Time, TheV Were
Not Timely Filed After They Were Or Could Have Been Known

Hairston’s Claims

His First Post-Conviction Petition,

A.

Introduction

Hairston’s

Amended

Successive Petition raises two claims.

the contention that murderers

m

and Montgomery be extended

between 18 and 21 who have been given the death penalty.
he must establish these claims are timely under LC.
within 42 days after they were

Resolution

when

1 1 1

the

movement

Who were

known

0n February 5, 2018,

in the

Recognizing

19-2719(5) and are being raised

0r reasonably could have been

same

(R., p.280.)

known, Hairston

And even though

“there

had been

earlier

direction within the legal and scientiﬁc communities, that

late adolescents at the

(R.,

§

(R., pp.260-80.)

t0 murderers

that “represented[ed] a tipping point in the nationwide

did not crystalize until the

punishment.”

upon

American Bar Association House of Delegates (ABA) adopted

recognition of [his claims].”

movement

ﬁrst relies

between 18 and 21 cannot be given the death penalty. The

second asks that the requirements 0f

contends that

The

ABA announced its considered View that prisoners

time 0f their offenses should be exempted from capital

pp.280-81) (quotes omitted).

Concluding “[t]he State made no speciﬁc argument that the newly discovered issues
raised

by

[Hairston]

were known 0r reasonably should have been known outside of the

time limit for raising those claims,” and that the arguments

made by

the state

were too

“cursory” and failed to “provide sufﬁcient notice,” the district court rejected the state’s
assertion that Hairston’s

when he ﬁled his

two claims were known or reasonably could have been known

ﬁrst post-conviction or, alternatively, that they were not timely ﬁled after

they were

known

or reasonably could have been known. (R., pp.771-72.) Therefore, the

court addressed the merits of Hairston’s claims. (R., pp.772-84.)

Because

it

was Hairston’s burden

district court erred

by concluding

if

they could not have been

timely ﬁled

meet the requirements of LC.

his claims are not barred since they

known When he ﬁled

reasonably could have been

even

t0

known when

when they were known

expressly challenged whether the

or reasonably could have been known.

B.

Standard

pursuant t0 LC. § 19—2719

this

were known 0r

was

ﬁled, they

were not

Moreover, the

When

the claims

state

were

Of Review

Whether a successive

W,

the ﬁrst petition

Resolution was the point

known

19-2719, the

his ﬁrst post-conviction petition and,

or could have been known.

ABA’s

§

is

petition for post—conviction relief

was properly dismissed

a question of law which this Court reviews de nova.

m

154 Idaho 347, 349, 298 P.3d 241 (2013) (quotes and citation omitted). “‘When

Court

is

presented with a motion to dismiss by the State based upon the provisions 0f

Idaho Code § 19-27 1 9, the proper standard of review

this

Court should utilize

is t0

directly

address the motion, determine Whether or not the requirements of section 19-2719 have

been met, and rule accordingly.”’ Hairston

II,

144 Idaho

at

55 (quoting Creech

V. State,

137 Idaho 573, 575, 51 P.3d 387 (2002)).

C.

Hairston’s

Amended

Idaho Code
in all capital cases.

proceedings,

§

Successive Petition

19-2719

Is

Governed By LC.

sets forth special appellate

S

19-2719

and post—conviction procedures

Capital post-conviction proceedings, like non-capital post-conviction

Which are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act

(“UPCPA”),
Pizzuto

are civil in nature

V. State,

and governed by the Idaho Rules 0f Civil Procedure.

127 Idaho 469, 470, 903 P.2d 58 (1995). Idaho Code

UPCPA

eliminate the applicability of the

“supersedes the

UPCPA t0

19-2719 does not

in capital cases, but acts as a

the extent that their provisions conﬂict.”

w,

133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144 (1999);

§

127 Idaho

at

modiﬁer and

McKinney

V. State,

470.

Speciﬁcally, LC. § 19-2719 provides a capital defendant one opportunity t0 raise
all

challenges t0 the conviction and sentence in a post-conviction reliefpetition which must

be ﬁled within forty-two days

ofjudgment. State

after entry

The only exception

806, 820 P.2d 665 (1991).

is

Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795,

provided in LC. § 19-2719(5), which

permits a successive petition “in those unusual cases where
issues raised

V.

it

can be demonstrated that the

were not known and reasonably could not have been known Within the time

frame allowed by the

statute.”

Additionally, claims

120 Idaho

I_d.,

at

807.

which were not known or which could not have reasonably

been known Within forty-two days ofjudgment “must be asserted Within a reasonable time
after they are

known

0r reasonably could have been known.” Paz V. State, 123 Idaho 758,

760, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 701. In ascertaining what constitutes

a “reasonable time,” this Court explained:
[A] reasonable time for ﬁling a successive petition for post-conviction relief
is forty-two days after the petitioner knew 0r reasonably should have known

0f the claim, unless petitioner shows that there were extraordinary
circumstances that prevented him or her from ﬁling the claim within that
time period.
after the

Pizzuto

V. State,

In that event,

claim was

known

it still

must be ﬁled within a reasonable time

0r knowable.

146 Idaho 720, 727, 202 P.3d 642 (2008).

A capital defendant Who brings a successive petition for post-conviction relief has
a “heightened burden and must

make

a

prima facie showing

that issues raised in that

petition ﬁt within the

471.

narrow exception provided by the

statute.”

The heightened pleading requirement mandated by

I.C. §

Pizzuto, 127 Idaho at

19-2719(5)(a) requires

successive petitioners t0 allege facts in the successive petition demonstrating

claim was
42,

known

when

the

or reasonably could have been known. Stuart V. State, 149 Idaho 35, 41-

232 P.3d 813 (2010).

Even

if the petitioner

additional requirements that

An

can meet these mandates,

I.C. § 19-2719(5)(a) details the

must be met before the successive

petition

may be heard:
may be

allegation that a successive post-conviction petition

heard because 0f the applicability of the exception herein for issues that

were not known 0r could not reasonably have been known shall not be
considered unless the applicant shows the existence of such issues by (i) a
precise statement 0f the issue 0r issues asserted together with (ii) material
facts stated under oath 0r afﬁrmation by credible persons with ﬁrst hand
knowledge that would support the issue or issues asserted. A pleading that
fails to make a showing of excepted issues supported by material facts, 0r
which is not credible, must be summarily dismissed.
LC.

§ 19-2719(5)(a).

If a capital petitioner fails to

issues are

“deemed

to consider

McKinney, 133 Idaho

§ 19-2719(5)(a)

V. State,

have [been] waived” and “[t]he courts 0f Idaho

at 700.

have no power
I.C.

Likewise, failure t0 meet the requirements of

mandates dismissal 0f the successive post-conviction

petition. Fields

135 Idaho 286, 289-90, 17 P.3d 230 (2000). The merits of Hairston’s claims can

only be reached after this Court ﬁnds that
Stuart,

shall

§ 19-2719, the

any such claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any such relief.”

§ 19-2719(5);

LC.

t0

comply With the requirements 0f LC.

149 Idaho
In State V.

I.C. §

19-2719’s requirements have been met.

at 42.

Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 213, 766 P.2d 678 (1988),

the purpose and policy behind the passage of I.C. § 19-2719:

this

Court discussed

The underlying

purpose behind the statute stated the need to

legislative

expeditiously conclude criminal proceedings and recognized the use 0f
dilatory tactics

by those sentenced to death to “thwart their

The

sentences.”

purpose is t0 “avoid such abuses of legal process by requiring that
.”
collateral claims for relief
be consolidated in one proceeding.

statute’s
all

.

We

.

.

the interminable delay in capital cases

ofthe 42-day time limit

set for

problem and attempted

the

rationally related

constitutionally

t0

the

LC.

t0

.

.

hold that the legislature’s determination that
is

it

was necessary t0 reduce

a rational basis for the imposition

19-27 1 9. The legislature has identiﬁed

§

remedy

legitimate

it

with a statutory scheme that

legislative

is

purpose 0f expediting

imposed sentences.

This Court has historically followed the requirements of LC. § 19-27 1 9,

strictly

and

regularly dismissing successive capital post-conviction relief claims because ofpetitioners’

failure to

meet the narrow exception 0f LC.

Creech V.

State,

151 (2001);

§ 19-2719(5).

See

e.g. Stuart,

149 Idaho 35;

137 Idaho 573, 51 P.3d 387 (2002); Porter V. State, 136 Idaho 257, 32 P.3d

Row V.

State,

135 Idaho 573, 21 P.3d 895 (2001); Rhoades

V. State,

135 Idaho

299, 17 P.3d 243 (2000); Paradis

V. State,

127 Idaho 469; Lankford

127 Idaho 100, 897 P.2d 991 (1995). The Court has also

V. State,

followed the requirements of

I.C. §

128 Idaho 223, 912 P.2d 110 (1996); Pizzuto,

19-2719, strictly and regularly afﬁrming the district

of petitioners’

courts’ dismissal 0f successive capital post-conviction claims because

failure to

meet the narrow exceptions of LC.

requirements of I.C. §§ 19-2719(5)(a) and

135 Idaho 286; Pizzuto

V. State,

(b).

19-2719(5), including the pleading

§

See

e.g. Fields,

application 0f LC. § 19-2719 has been recognized

In

Coleman

V.

at

134 Idaho 793, 10 P.3d 742 (2000); Sivak

Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636 (2000); McKinney, 133 Idaho 695.

Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 533

154 Idaho

(9th Cir.

by

298; Fields,

V. State,

134

This regular and consistent

the Ninth Circuit.

See Hoffman

V.

2001).

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991),

the

Supreme Court discussed

the signiﬁcance 0f regular and consistent application 0f state procedural bars, explaining:

10

In the habeas context, the application of the independent and

grounded in concerns of comity and
would be able t0 do in
habeas what this Court could not do on direct review; habeas would offer
state prisoners Whose custody was supported by independent and adequate
state grounds an end run around the limits of this Court’s jurisdiction and a
means to undermine the State’s interest in enforcing its laws.
adequate state ground doctrine

is

federalism. Without the rule, a federal district court

Because Hairston Failed T0 Establish His Claims Are Timely, The District Court
Erred, And This Court Should Dismiss The Claims Pursuant T0 I.C. S 19-2719

D.

Initially, the district court’s assertion that the state

argument
that

as

that his claims are ‘based

had not yet been issued

at the

Not only did

0n new developments’ and

that did not

come

[

]

Hairston’s

ﬂow from judicial opinions

time 0f his most recent post-conviction

from emerging science and data

incorrect.

“did not dispute

to fruition until

litigation, as

2018”

well

(R., p.1 1) is

the state’s answer contend that Hairston’s claims are time barred

because they could have been raised 0n direct appeal and, alternatively, were raised beyond
the statute of limitation (R., p.726), the State’s Brief in Support of

Dismissal explained that Hairston’s

Amended

Motion

for

Summary

Successive Petition “is time barred,

is

a

successive petition and contains claims that were 0r could have been raised in previous

proceedings.” (R., pp.734-35.)

Addressing the
19-2719.

(R.,

state’s

pp.737-38.)

motion, Hairston recognized his case

Amended

Amended

“Why

Successive Petition set forth

emerging science and data

LC

§

Successive Petition, and contended his

his claims

were properly raised within the

time-frame established by the statute,” and that his “claims
at the

governed by

Speciﬁcally addressing the state’s timeliness argument,

Hairston cited various exhibits from his

had not been issued

is

ﬂow from judicial opinions that

time of his recent post-conviction
that did not

come

t0 fruition until

11

litigation, as

2018.”

(R.,

well as from

pp.740-41 .)

In response, at the hearing on the state’s motion, the prosecutor expressly moved to
dismiss the Amended Successive Petition under I.C. § 19-2719 and addressed the ABA
Resolution (Tr., pp.14-15) that Hairston had contended was the “tipping point” that
allegedly crystallized the movement from the legal and scientific communities providing
the “comparable event” upon which he could rely for the starting point to file his successive
petition (R., pp.280-81). Specifically, the prosecutor stated:
[W]e are not here -- the Court is not here to make new law based on ABA
resolutions or standards being applied in other jurisdictions. The
controlling authorities that we have, the Idaho Supreme Court and the US
Supreme Court, nothing compelling or controlling has come out. The last
really controlling case that [Hairston] cited that would apply here is Roper,
from 2005, and that applied to cruel and unusual [punishment] to under the
age of eighteen. . . . Mr. Hairston’s age was known in 1996 when the
murders were committed. I don’t think it’s any secret that young men are
inherently immature. I don’t think that’s ever been a secret.”
(Tr., pp.14-15.)
While asserting that the ABA Resolution is not new law upon which he was relying,
Hairston confirmed “that ABA’s Resolution 111 was the first embodiment of this new
principle that the Roper rule should be extended to under twenty-one defendants, that it
was the first recognition of that on a national scale that would give us the kind of
groundwork that would need to file a Petition of this sort.” (Tr., p.18.)
The state’s arguments, coupled with Hairston’s responses, show that Hairston had
sufficient notice regarding the state’s grounds for dismissal. Consequently, the district
court erred by failing to dismiss Hairston’s claims based upon timeliness under I.C. § 192719. Indeed, there was more than sufficient information in the record to establish that
Resolution 111 could not be the document or event that started the 42-day period for filing
Hairston’s claims. Resolution 111 itself is based upon information that existed well before

12

its

issuance in February 2018. For example, Resolution 111 noted that as early as August

2017, courts in Kentucky began concluding

under 21 t0 death

making

(R.,

unconstitutional to sentence murderers

p.663 n.18), and that “[c]apita1 defense attorneys are increasingly

this constitutional

claim in death penalty litigation” (R., p.663). Resolution 111

also noted that empirical research prior t0

(2005),

was

it

Roper

Which eliminated the death penalty

V.

Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70

for murderers

under

18, pointed t0 the

conclusion that brain development continues after 18. (R., pp.666-67 n.44.) The research

post-m involved studies from 2005-2008 and a “Wide body of research” providing an
“expanded understanding 0f behavioral and psychological tendencies of 18
olds.” (R., pp.666-67 n.45.) Indeed, 0f all the research cited

is

from 2016.

March

12,

(R.,

pp.666-67 notes 44-49.)

the extent Hairston

is

111, the latest

relying

upon the

2018 Declaration ofDr. Laurence Steinberg, he helped complete a study in 2009

to support the conclusion that

ﬁxture consequences.”

relied

And t0

by Resolution

to 21 year

(R.,

“18 t0 21 year olds are not fully mature enough t0 anticipate
p.667 n.48.)

Additionally, the “legislative developments”

many

in

Dr. Steinberg’s declaration also provides evidence that Hairston’s petition

is

upon by Resolution 111

all

occurred prior to adoption of the resolution,

2017. (R., pp.668-70 notes 56-70.)

untimely. Dr. Steinberg expressly avers that over the past ten years, “additional scientiﬁc

evidence has accrued indicating that

immaturity

characteristic

characteristic

states,

of early

of late adolescents.”

many

aspects 0f psychological and neurobiological

adolescents

and

(R., p.296.) Citing a

middle

2006

adolescents

article,

are

also

Dr. Steinberg further

“Developmental science therefore does not support the bright—line boundary that

observed in criminal law under Which 18—year-olds are categorically deemed adults.”

13

is

(Id.)

Relying upon one of the 2017 cases from Kentucky, he continues, “The recognition that
the

same

sort

0f psychological and neurobiological immaturity characteristic ofjuveniles

under the age 0f 1 8 also applies to individuals between 18 and 21 suggests that the Supreme
Court’s logic in Roper

.

.

.

late adolescents (ages 18-20).”

should be extended t0

(Id.)

Indeed, in concluding that “the notion that brain maturation continues into late adolescence

and early adulthood has become Widely accepted among neuroscientists”
Steinberg cites a

The same

is

number of

studies dating

from 2009 through 2014

(R.,

(R., p.298), Dr.

pp.298-99

n.8).

true with respect t0 the studies involving psychological immaturity in

adolescence; they

all

pre-date Resolution 111. (R., pp.299-303 notes 9-23.) Likewise, the

evidence supporting Dr. Steinberg’s discussion of neurobiological accounts of adolescent

immaturity

all

existed prior t0 Resolution 111. (R., pp. 12-15 notes 24-32.)

While Resolution 111 and Dr. Steinberg may have conveniently compiled these
resources, there

was nothing preventing Hairston or

so-called developments

and ﬁling

his

Amended

his attorneys

from researching these

Successive Petition years ago. However,

Hairston’s attorneys did not d0 the necessary research and apparently did not even

0f its existence

until Resolution 111

was n0 requirement

was passed by

for “recognition 0f [the issue]

the

ABA.

(R., p.680.)

on a national scale”

(Tr.,

claims to have been known. The ﬁnal compilation of evidence (Resolution

1 1

a claim in a successive post-conviction petition

In

Idaho

at

727, this Court concluded

it

is

not the starting point.

was reasonable

know

There simply
p.18) for the

1)

supporting

w,

146

for the petitioner to wait t0 ﬁle his

successive petition until after the Idaho Legislature enacted appropriate procedures t0 ﬁle

a claim under Atkins V. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which eliminated the death penalty
for those that are intellectually disabled.

However, the

14

petitioner did not ﬁle his petition

for another 84 days.

Li.

Rejecting the contention that the petition was ﬁled Within a

reasonable time because 0f the complexity 0f the issue and the time required t0 develop

“The reasonable time

the facts, this Court reasoned,

at issue is the

time necessary to develop

sufﬁcient facts to ﬁle the post-conviction proceeding, not the time necessary to develop

facts that Will

be offered in an attempt to prove the claim.”

Hairston’s case

is

no

different than

m;

I_d.

sufﬁcient facts were readily available

prior to issuance of Resolution 111 for Hairston to ﬁle his successive petition.

capital defense attorneys

all

were “increasingly making

this constitutional

If other

claim in death

penalty litigation” prior to Resolution 111 (R., p.663), especially in Kentucky Where the
court actually extended Roper to murderers between 18 and 21, see

Commonwealth

V.

Bredhold, Order Declaring Kentucky’s Death Penalty Statute as Unconstitutional, 14-CR161, *1, 12 (Fayette Cir. Ct., Aug.

been making the same claims

1,

2017), there

was no reason Hairston could not have

at that time, if not earlier.

Likewise, there was no reason that

Dr. Steinberg could not have been consulted years ago.

available prior to Resolution

claims

much

earlier, are

1 1 1

(201

1);

Which caused other capital defense attorneys

more compelling

invitation to adopt guidelines

Indeed, the research and cases

from the

in Idaho

ABA.

State V. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 782,

where

948 P.2d 127 (1997).

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 201 n.21

upon an amicus

Dr. Steinberg, noted,

brief from the

Court has declined the

Hall V. State, 151 Idaho 42, 53, 253 P.3d 716

Moreover, in National Riﬂe Assoc. of America,

relying

this

t0 raise these

Inc.

(5th Cir.

V.

Bureau of Alcohol,

2012), the Fifth Circuit,

American Medical Association and an

article

from

“modern scientiﬁc research supports the commonsense notion

18-to-20-year-olds tend to be

more impulsive than young

15

adults aged 21

that

and over.” That

same “commonsense notion” coupled with
2012

also provided sufﬁcient information

Successive

Amended

the

“modern scientiﬁc research”

and evidence for Hairston

t0

existing in

have ﬁled his

Petition long before adoption 0f Resolution 111. Indeed,

numerous

courts addressed the question ofwhether new developments in scientiﬁc and psychological

issued. See e.g.

Gribshaw

Butler V. Wetzel, 2014

V.

m m
and

long before Resolution 111 was

Wenerowicz, 2016

WL 1161079, *24-25 (2016 W.D. Penn);

research warranted an extension 0f

WL 502362, *4-5 (E.D. Penn. 2014); LeaveV V. Kerastes, 2014 WL

5823067, *3-4 (E.D. Penn. 2014) (citing cases); Commonwealth

94

(Pa. Super. 2016);

People

In State V. Seats, 865

two leading scholars
that the

human

m,
(E.D.

should

Holman, 91 N.E.3d 849

N.W.2d

in adolescent

(Ill.

2017).

m

development t0 conclude, “current science demonstrates

brain continues to develop into the early twenties.”

V.

Farmer, 2019

See also

WL 4247629,

*4

York), the petitioner relied upon Dr. Steinberg’s testimony from a different

contend his federal habeas petition was timely because

toll

149 A.3d 90,

545, 557 (Iowa 2015), the court cited a prior case and

353 P.3d 55, 125-126 (Utah 2015). In U.S.

New

district t0

V.

V. Furgess,

the one-year statute of limitation.

much of Dr.

it

provided

new facts that

The court noted the petitioner conceded

“that

Steinberg’s conclusions were previously published in his 2003 works,” and,

therefore, the court concluded that Dr. Steinberg’s

that warranted statutory tolling.

In

(Penn. 2019), the petitioner relied

20 1 7 testimony did not create a new

Commonwealth

upon

V.

Brown, 2019

WL

fact

2808349, *4

scientiﬁc studies concerning brain development t0

contend that his petition was timely. Recognizing the scientiﬁc studies relied upon by the
petitioner

Li.

“were in existence long before December 2017, the court

In Cruz V. U.S.,

2018

WL

rej ected

1541898, *6-7 (D. Conn. 2018), a federal

16

the argument.

district

judge

opined that

m

should be extended to defendants

who

are over 18.

That court

recognized other courts, dating as far back as 2014, had addressed this question.
Obviously,

if other courts

were addressing

this question as far

back as 2014, there was no

reason Hairston could not have followed suit and also raised his claims

The claims
district court’s

Amended

in Hairston’s

contrary conclusion

was

basis that Hairston failed t0

Petition

meet

was timely ﬁled under LC.

his

§

Successive Petition are untimely, and the

error.

Court should dismiss Hairston’s appeal

at that time.

Therefore, pursuant to LC. § 19-2719, this

or, alternatively,

afﬁrm the

burden 0f establishing the

district court

Amended

on the

Successive

19-2719.

II.

T0 Establish The District Court Erred BV Summarilv Dismissing
That Would Bar Imposition Of The Death Penalty For Murderers Under 21

Hairston Has Failed

Claim
A.

1

Introduction

Because the

district court

dismissed Claim

1

based upon the merits of Hairston’s

argument, as an alternative argument t0 the bars associated With LC.
Will also address the merits of Claim

§

19-2719, the state

1.

Based upon so-called evolving standards of decency, both nationally and

in Idaho,

Hairston contends that imposing the death penalty violates federal and state constitutional
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment, and that the prohibition from

Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), Which abolished the death penalty
should be extended to murderers under 21
if this

.

(Brief, pp.3-25.)

for murderers

Roper

under

V.

18,

He further contends that even

Court rejects a categorical rule prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty for

those under 21 that his

(Brief, pp.16-18.)

own

lack of maturity requires his death sentence to be vacated.

Hairston also contends the district court erred by applying the wrong
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standard in summarily dismissing his

Amended

Successive Petition because there

is

a

genuine issue 0f material fact regarding evolving standards of decency, and that his case
should be remanded to apply the “correct”

remanded
that

for an evidentiary hearing, or

was not presented

test

and grant post-conviction

relief,

be

be remanded for consideration of new evidence

t0 the district court but allegedly establishes evolving standards

decency that prevent the execution 0f murderers under 2 1.

of

(Brief, pp.25-32.)

Hairston has failed t0 demonstrate that evolving standards of decency, either
nationally 0r in Idaho, prohibit the imposition 0f the death penalty for murderers between

18 and 21, Whether as part 0f a categorical rule 0r speciﬁc t0 Hairston.

applied the correct standard

by accepting

The

district court

as true all of the evidence Hairston presented, but

simply concluding, based upon that evidence, that there

is

n0 consensus nationally or

in

Idaho against imposing the death penalty against murderers between 18 and 2 1.

B.

Standard
In

Of Review

Charboneau

Savkhamchone

V.

V. State,

State,

140 Idaho 789, 793, 102 P.3d 1108 (2004) (quoting

127 Idaho 319, 321, 900 P.2d 795 (1995) (quotes and citation

omitted), this Court reafﬁrmed the standard of review in post-conviction cases

summary dismissal

is

When

granted:

In determining Whether a motion for

summary

disposition

is

properly

must review the facts in a light most favorable t0 the petitioner, and
determine whether they would entitle petitioner to relief if accepted as true. A court
is required to accept the petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, but need not
accept the petitioner’s conclusions. The standard t0 be applied to a trial court’s
determination that no material issue 0f fact exists is the same type of determination
as in a summary judgment proceeding.
granted, a court

18

C.

The Eighth Amendment And General Standards Regarding Evolving Standards Of
Decency
The Eighth Amendment provides, “Excessive

bail shall not

be required, nor

excessive ﬁnes imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inﬂicted.” U.S. Const.

VIII.

has been applied t0 the States through the

It

Amendment. Wilson V.

Seiter,

370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962)).
(plurality),

by

detailed

As recognized

in

Trop

V. Dulles,

constitutional phrase ‘cruel

356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958)

and unusual’ has not been

Supreme] Court.” However, relying upon the Anglo-American tradition

0f criminal justice and

Amendment must draw

Weems
its

V. U.S.,

Thompson

V.

217 U.S. 349 (1910), the Court concluded, “The

meaning from the evolving standards of decency

progress 0f a maturing society.”

In

Process Clause 0f the Fourteenth

501 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1991) (citing Robinson V. California,

“The exact scope of the
[the

Due

Am.

I_d.

that

mark

the

at 101.

Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821-22 (1988), the Court addressed the

question of Whether the death penalty could be imposed for children under 16, and

explained that in performing the task of ascertaining evolving standards of decency “the

Court has reviewed the work product 0f
carefully considered the reasons

Why

state legislatures

a civilized society

and sentencing

may

juries,

and has

accept 0r reject the death

penalty in certain types of cases.” This requires review 0f relevant legislative enactments,

jury determinations, and ultimately the Court’s independent judgment. Li.

More

recently, the

consideration of

enactments and

6“

Supreme Court described the standard

state practice’ to

at 572).

822-83.

as ﬁrst requiring

objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative

the sentence practice at issue.”

543 U.S.

at

determine Whether there

Graham V.

Florida,

is

a national consensus against

560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010) (quoting Roper,

Then guided by “the standards elaborated by

19

controlling precedents and

the Court’s

by

own

understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s

text,

must determine

own

history meaning, and purpose, the Court

in the exercise

of

its

independent judgment Whether the punishment in question violates the Constitution.” Li.
(quotes and citations omitted).

Addressing the work product of state legislatures, in Thompson, 487 U.S.
3

1

,

the Court not only discussed the

number 0f states

compared

to adults

823-

that did not permit the death penalty

for juveniles under 16, but legislation demonstrating a distinction

children as

at

between the

rights

0f

and the Views of “respected professional organizations,”

“other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage,” and “leading

members 0f

the

Western European community.” Addressing the behavior of juries, the Court found the
death penalty had been imposed 0n only ﬁve children under 16 between 1982 and 1986.
Li. at 832-33.

Ultimately, recognizing the importance 0f the judgments of legislatures and juries,
the Court concluded, “it

is

for us ultimately t0 judge

Whether the Eighth Amendment

permits imposition of the death penalty on such as petitioner

murder when he was only

making

by

the

that

judgment,

same standard

we

Li

at

Who committed

833 (quotes and citation omitted).

ﬁrst ask Whether the juvenile’s culpability should be

as that 0f an adult,

a heinous

“In

measured

and then consider whether the application of the

death penalty t0 this class of offenders measurably contributes to the social purposes that
are served

by

the death penalty.” Li. (quotes and citation omitted).

Court, having a different culpability standard for children
“[i]nexperience, less education, and less intelligence

make

evaluate the consequence of his or her conduct while at the

20

is

As

fairly

explained by the

obvious because

the teenager less able to

same time he or she

is

much

more

apt to be motivated

by mere emotion

0r peer pressure than

is

an adult.”

“two principal social purposes:

The Court

also

retribution

and deterrence 0f capital crimes by prospective offenders.”

reafﬁrmed

that the death penalty serves

and citation omitted). However, the Court opined that for children under
could not be met. Li.

at

Li. at 835.

I_d.

at

836 (quotes

16, those

purposes

836-37.

In Roper, 543 U.S. at 560-78, the Court addressed these general principles, and

concluded the death penalty could n0 longer be imposed on murderers under

18.

Importantly, however, the Court recognized the subjective nature 0f not extending the

prohibition

beyond 18-year-olds, and

expanded beyond

inferred that the cut—off

was 18 and would not be

that age:

Drawing

the line at 18 years of age

is

subject,

of course, t0 the

The qualities that
from adults do not disappear When an individual turns
18. By the same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of
maturity some adults will never reach. For the reasons we have discussed,
however, a line must be drawn. The plurality opinion in Thompson drew
objections always raised against categorical rules.
distinguish juveniles

the line at 16. In the intervening years the
that offenders

logic 0f

under 16

may

Thompson extends

Thompson

plurality’s conclusion

not be executed has not been challenged. The

t0 those

Who are under 18. The age 0f 18 is the
many purposes between childhood

point where society draws the line for

and adulthood.
eligibility ought

Li

D.

It is,

we

conclude, the age at which the line for death

t0 rest.

at 574.

This Court Has

N0 Authority T0 Expand The

Cut-Off Beyond 18 Years

Based upon the Supremacy Clause, When a claim involves the
federal Constitution, this Court

precedent.

elemental

is

mandated

to follow

State V. Holtslander, 102 Idaho 306, 309,

principle

of our system

Of Age

interpretation of the

United States Supreme Court

629 P.2d 702 (1981)

(“It is

an

of federalism that ultimate responsibility for

21

interpretation of the federal constitution rests with the U.S.

Rhoades

et a1.

149 Idaho

at

133 (quoting Danforth

V.

Supreme Court”); see also

Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 280 (2008))

(“States are independent sovereigns With plenary authority to

make and

enforce their

own

laws as long as they do not infringe on federal constitutional guarantees”).

Therefore,

because the Supreme Court has not extended the prohibition adopted in

t0 include

murderers between 18 and 2 1

,

this

Court

is

not free to unilaterally

make

m

that

change under

the federal Constitution.

This

is

particularly true since the decision Whether evolving standards 0f

includes murderers between 18 and 21

is

ultimately based

independent judgment, not judgments of lower courts.

Court explained,

“We also acknowledged in Coker [v.

that the objective evidence,

In

upon

m,

the

decency

Supreme Court’s

536 U.S.

at

31

the

1,

Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977),]

though 0f great importance, did not “Wholly determine’ the

controversy, ‘for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our

own judgment

Will

be

brought t0 bear 0n the question of the acceptability 0f the death penalty under the Eighth

Amendment.” See
citations,

also

m,

at

593-94 (O’Connor,

and emphasis omitted) (chastising the

Court precedent and explaining,

of its precedents
to

543 U.S.

.

.

.

“it

remains

J.,

dissenting) (quotes,

state court for refusing to

follow Supreme

this Court’s prerogative alone t0 overrule

even Where subsequent decisions or factual developments

have signiﬁcantly undermined the rationale for our
This Court has recognized

Court precedent. In State

V.

it is

one

may appear

earlier holding”).

Without authority t0 change 0r overrule Supreme

Newman, 108 Idaho

5, 11 n.6,

696 P.2d 856 (1985),

this

Court

explained that while federal and state constitutions “derive their power from independent
sources,” the states are not free t0 ignore or abandon

22

Supreme Court precedent When

the

issue involves the federal Constitution. See also Alexander V. Stibal, 161 Idaho 253, 443

n.4,

385 P.3d 431 (2016) (quoting James

V.

City 0f Boise,

---

U.S.

---,

136 S.Ct. 685, 686

(2016)) (“The Idaho Supreme Court, like any other state 0r federal court,
Court's interpretation of federal law.).

m

to

Not only has

the

,

Because

and 21, the

this

Court

Without authority t0 expand

is

district court’s denial

Hairston Has Failed

E.

Warrant

To

m

spills

expand

V.

Alabama,

to murderers

---

U.S.

--

between 18

of this claim must be afﬁrmed.

Establish National Evolving Standards

An Expansion Of Roper To Murderers Between

While Hairston

to

this

spring the Court denied

last

Court for such an expansion. Samra

139 S.Ct. 2050 (2019).5

-,

bound by

Supreme Court refused

murderers between the ages 0f 18 and 2 1 but just this

certiorari in a case asking the

is

18

Of Decech

And 21

considerable ink discussing various ﬁndings from the medical

and scientiﬁc communities, the number of executions involving murderers between 18 and
2 1 the actual imposition 0f the death penalty for such murderers, “statutory developments”
,

involving prohibitions other than imposing the death penalty but impacting 18 to 21 year

olds,

and international law, he

fails t0 cite

a single case

death penalty has been extended to 18 to 20 year 01ds.6

5

The

where

M’s

abolition of the

Indeed, in Foster V. State, 258

which describes the question before the Supreme Court,
at
https ://www. supremecourt. gov/DocketPDF/ 1 8/ 1 8can
found
be
9033/97588/20190427135055686 Samra%20-%20Cert%2Opetiti0n%202019%20Petitioner’s opening brief,

%20Fina1.p_df.
6

The

aware

Kentucky a judge issued a pretrial ruling prohibiting the state
from seeking the death penalty for a murderer that was seven months past his eighteenth
state is

birthday.

that in

See Commonwealth

V.

Diaz, 15

CR

584-001 (Fayette

Cir. Ct. Sept. 6, 2017).

on interlocutory appeal before the Kentucky Supreme
Court.
See Bailey Vandiver, “Trial Delayed, Death Penalty Under Review,”
Kentuckykernal, October 20, 2017. Moreover, no court has approvingly cited the opinion
even though it was issued more than two years ago.
However,

that decision

is

currently

23

So.3d 1248, 1253-54

upon nearly

(Fla. 2018),

not only did the court reject the same arguments based

identical evidence that Hairston advances in his case,

including

ABA

Resolution 111, but the court concluded such evidence was not even newly discovered.

See also Otte

m,

V. State,

96 N.E. 3d 1288, 1292-93 (Ohio

t0

expand

and recognizing “nothing prevented Otte from making that argument with scientiﬁc

evidence in a successive petition for habeas corpus

m

App. 2017) (refusing

Ct.

at

some

earlier point in time”).

In Mitchell V. State, 235 P.3d 640, 659 (Ok. 2010), the court refused t0 extend

t0 a

murderer

Who was two weeks

past his eighteenth birthday, concluding,

“The

U.S. Supreme Court has drawn a bright line at eighteen (18) years of age for death
eligibility.

punishment

.

.

is

Under

.

the plain language of Roper, the prohibition against capital

limited to the execution of an offender for any crime committed before his

18th birthday.” In

Farmer V.

State,

court rejected an expansion of

held that there

See also U.S.

is

268 So.3d 1009, 1009-10

m,

(Fla. Dist. Ct.

reasoning, “The United States

App. 2019), the

Supreme Court has

a bright line between being a juvenile and an adult; that line

V. Mitchell,

502 F.3d 93 1, 981

(9th Cir.

2007)

(rej ecting

is

eighteen.”

a claim that “evolving

standards 0f decency” prohibit the execution of a 20-year—old); U.S. V. Lopez-Cabrera,

2015

WL 3880503, *2 (S.D. New York 2015) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 74-75) (“The

Court again
to

set a bright line at

be imperfect,’

line for

id. at

75,

it

age 18: While acknowledging that ‘[c]ategorical rules tend

noted that

‘[t]he

age of 18

many purposes between childhood and

is

the point

adulthood,’

TDCJ-CID, 73 F.Supp.3d 693, 786 (E.D. Texas 2014)

id. at

24

74.”); Garcia V. Director

(declining to extend

murderer that was 18 years, 2 months and 12 days old

Commonwealth V. Towles, 208 A.3d 988, 1009

where society draws the

at the

Roper

to a

time 0f the murder);

(Penn. 2019) (quotes and citation omitted)

(“The age 18

is

Where society draws the

the point

childhood and adulthood and

Thompson

V. State,

bright-line rule

is

the age at

Which the

line for

many

purposes between

line for death eligibility should rest”);

153 So.3d 84, 178 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 2012) (“Roper establishes a

based on the chronological age of the defendant”).

Based upon

This same analysis governs Hairston’s claims.

his failure t0 cite a

single jurisdiction (outside 0f one judge in Kentucky) that has adopted his

newly discovered “evolving standards of decency” should
to 18 t0 21 year olds, his claim fails. Rather, evidence

from the medical,

scientiﬁc,

result in

argument

an expansion of

that

m

0f a murderer’s age and the studies

and psychological communities are properly presented as

mitigation on a case-by-case basis.

Moreover, the “evidence” upon which Hairston

would lead

this

Court to believe.

While he again

relies is not as

spills

compelling as he

considerable ink discussing the

number of murderers under 21 who have been sentenced to death or executed
10),

he

fails to

acknowledge

number that have passed

that since

m,

of the

states that retain the death penalty, the

statutes barring the imposition

speciﬁcally between 18 and 21
Hairston’s reliance

is

(Brief, pp.7-

of the death penalty for murderers

zero.

upon execution moratoriums

is

also unavailing.

For example,

while California’s governor unilaterally imposed a moratorium on executions, the death
penalty remains available under California law, and

unaltered.

all

current death sentences remain

California Executive Order No. N—O9-19, https://bit.ly/2VD066u.

Moreover,

prosecutors continue to seek the penalty for murderers between 18 and 21.

Meagan

Flynn,

A

Suspected Serial Killer Called the “Hollywood Ripper”

Washington Post (May

3,

is

See

0n

e.g.,

Trial.

2019), https://bit.1y/2UYZJOD; Rebecca Plevin, Jorge L. Ortiz,

25

and Joel Shannon, Prosecutors Seek Life Without Parole 0r Death Penalty for Teen

Accused

in

San

Diego

https://bit.lv/2DNWqU\k.

Synagogue

Attack,

USA

Today

Additionally, the moratorium

(April

30,

2019),

for all executions, not just

is

murderers between 18 and 21.
Likewise, the delay in executions

is

Changes

not compelling.

contributed enormously to execution delays.

in the

law have

In Idaho, several executions have been

delayed because 0f changes in the law from the Supreme Court. For example, Martinez

m, 566

U.S.

Hairston

Ramirez, 746 Fed. Appx. 633, 633-34

V.

1

V.

(2012), has delayed several Idaho cases, including Hairston’s case.7

3,

2018) (remanding Hairston’s

Thomas Creech’s

case for consideration of Martinez issues).

Ninth Circuit 0n July

(9th Cir.

2012, because 0f Martinez, Creech

case

was remanded by the

Ramirez, #1299-cv-00224-

V.

BLW (Dkt. 294), and did not return t0 the Ninth Circuit until April 5, 2017, when he ﬁled
his

Amended Notice oprpeal (Dkt.

368),

Where the case

is still

pending, Creech V. Yordy,

#10-99015 (Dkt. 165). Gerald Pizzuto’s case was delayed because of
Pizzuto V. Blades, 933 F.3d 1166

(9th Cir.

m,

supra. See

2019). Additionally, most states are having an

exceptionally difﬁcult time ﬁnding the necessary drugs to complete an execution. Willie

James Inman, “Future ofLethal Injection
”
it,

7

Fox News

(July 3

1,

in

Doubt as

Critic,

Drug Makers Rebel Against

2018), https://Www.foxnews.com/us/future-of—lethal—iniection-in—

Supreme Court held, “Where, under state law, claims of
must be raised in an initial-review collateral
proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a
In Martinez,

566 U.S.

at 17, the

ineffective assistance 0f trial counsel

substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial

proceeding, there

was n0 counsel 0r counsel

if,

in the initial-review collateral

in that proceeding

was

was

ineffective.” Martinez

a landmark decision that opened the ﬂoodgates for litigation of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel claims that are being raised for the ﬁrst time in federal habeas and causing

signiﬁcant delay.

26

And many

doubt-as-critics-drug-makers—rebel—against-it.

while execution protocols are being
Arizona,

Inc., et a1. V.

Ryan,

stated, delays in executions

litigated.

et a1., ---

F.3d

---,

See

2019

do not establish there

e.g.

executions are being delayed

First

Amendment

Coalition 0f

WL 4419670 (9th Cir. 2019).

is

Simply

a national consensus to abolish the

death penalty for murderers between the ages of 18 and 21.
Hairston speciﬁcally relies upon various statutes that allegedly

conﬁrm those under

21 “do not have enough maturity t0 be treated as adults.” (Brief, pp.1 1-13.) While
true that legislative bodies

have made policy decisions regarding some

under 21, Hairston ignores some 0f the most important
permitted to engage.
discussed

activities

activities that those

it is

by those

under 21 are

In Farmer, 268 So.3d at 101 1-12 (footnotes omitted), the court

some 0f those

activities:

At eighteen, a person is mature enough t0 sit injudgment ofhis or her fellow
citizens 0n a jury in all but ﬁve states. At eighteen, a person can join the
military Without needing parental consent. At eighteen, male citizens are
required to register for the military draft so that in times of national

may be

compelled t0 ﬁght and perhaps die for their
states, at eighteen, a person acquires the
unrestricted right to consent to marriage. Even though many states have
recently enacted 0r proposed legislation to curtail the number of exceptions
allowing minors to enter into marriage, no state has changed the age of the
emergency, they

With the exception oftwo

country.

unrestricted right to marry.

In

all

but three

states, at eighteen, a

person

acquires the unrestricted right to enter into and be held accountable for
contracts.

At

eighteen, a person obtains the unrestricted right t0 consent to

healthcare services in every state except six.

In Idaho,

parts,

LC.

§

among other things,

at eighteen a

person

mature enough t0 donate body

39-3404, petition t0 terminate or modify a conservatorship, I.C. § 15-5-433(b),

join a state militia, I.C. § 45-102, obtain a tattoo or

a Will 0r Witness the execution of a will, LC.

Simply

is

stated,

§

body piercing,

I.C. § 18-1523(3), draft

15—2—501, and serve on a jury, I.C. § 2—209.

merely because someone cannot allegedly be trusted with alcohol,

27

t0

purchase a handgun (even though possession
pales in comparison t0 the activities those

is

not barred), gamble, 0r purchase marijuana

same individuals

More

are permitted t0 engage.

importantly, juveniles age 14 and above are automatically waived in adult court for serious

offenses, including murder, robbery, rape, forcible sexual penetration

obj ect, infamous crime against nature

battery With intent to

foreign

committed by force or Violence, mayhem, assault 0r

commit any of the above

certain controlled substances within

by use of a

1000

feet

offenses, the manufacture or delivery of

0f a school, and arson. LC.

20-509(1).

§

same

International developments are likewise unavailing, particularly since those

entities are

opposed

not just opposed t0 the death penalty for murderers between 18 and 21, but are

t0 the death penalty in

concluded

that,

“controlling.”

While

it

in

m,

543 U.S.

at 578, the

“proper” to acknowledge international opinion,

is

As recognized

2013), “Although appellant

any fashion. Even

Grounds, 2013

in Pratcher V.

may be

WL 5443047,

correct that the trend in international

it

Court
not

is

*36 (N.D. Cal.

law

is

toward the

protection and rehabilitation ofjuvenile offenders rather than punishment and deterrence,

at this

time in history, there

is

plainly

n0 consensus

judicial” against imposing the death penalty

in this country, either legislative 0r

0n murderers between 18 and 21.

Relying upon Dr. Steinberg’s report, Hairston also contends
“rejects the categorical exception for those

death sentence based on his

18.)

under twenty—one,

it

that,

should

even
still

own lack of maturity at the time 0f the murder.”

if this

Court

vacate

[his]

(Brief, pp.

1

6-

Hairston provides n0 authority for the proposition that the death penalty cannot be

imposed based upon

his “speciﬁc circumstances” allegedly

showing immaturity, being a

passive follower, that the murders were impulsive acts, and that his behavior after the

murders “was marked by the

sort

of reward-focused, shortsighted, and impetuous actions

28

characteristic

w,

of adolescents.”

146 Idaho

at

(Brief, p.17.)

725 (quotes and

On

that basis alone, his

citation omitted)

Irrespective, Hairston’s “lack of maturity” fairs

no

exception” because the courts have also declined t0 extend

is

Corn, 794 F.3d 1239

ﬁmctioning that

is

someone under

equivalent t0

(1

1th

Cir.

18.

18).

the holding

m

allegedly equivalent to 11 t0 13 year olds);

m,

but merely suffer from

e.g.

murderers Whose

V. Sec., Fla.

Dept. of

m

V.

Commonwealth,

to murderers with a mental

upon

m

to extend

supra, Which eliminated the death penalty for those that are

Who are not necessarily intellectually disabled,

some type 0f mental

People

t0

Bowling

In a similar vein, several murderers have also relied

from

See

better than his “categorical

2015) (declining to extend Roper t0 murderers with mental

intellectually disabled, t0 include murderers

rejected.

brief.”).

See Barwick

224 S.W.3d 577, 580-84 (Ky. 2006) (declining to extend
age below

fails.

(“We will not consider assignments

of error not supported by argument and authority in the opening

mental functioning

argument

V.

illness.

Those attempts have been routinely

Ghobrial, 420 P.3d 179, 199-201 (Cal. 2018); State V. Kleypas,

382 P.3d 373, 443-48 (Kan. 2016)

(citing cases).

Idaho and rejected by this Court. In State

V.

Those same attempts have been made

Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 389-80, 313 P.3d

in

1

(2013), this Court, recognizing that not a single jurisdiction had adopted this expansion,
also concluded “that a defendant’s mental illness does not prevent imposition of the death

penalty.” This Court recently declined t0 “revisit”

State V. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 814,

Moreover, there

is

its

prior decisions regarding this issue.

419 P.3d 1042 (2018).

certainly

n0 reason Hairston could not have raised

this

claim in

his direct appeal or ﬁrst post—conviction petition; clearly his personal level of “maturity”

was known

at that time.

Indeed, the district court speciﬁcally considered Hairston’s age
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and child development as mitigation.
t0 imposition

F.

This

(R., pp.873-74.)

is

classic mitigation, not a bar

of the death penalty.

Hairston Has Failed

T0

Establish Idaho Evolving Standards

An Expansion Of Roper To Murderers Between
Hairston next contends there

is

And 21

18

“Idaho-speciﬁc evidence 0f an emerging agreement

within the state that defendants twenty-one and below are

be condemned as beyond hope,” and that
consensus validating

Of Decency Warrant

if this

[his] claim, there is still

still

developing and should not

Court concludes “there

is

no national

an Idaho consensus validating his claim under

the cruel-and-unusual-punishment clause of the state constitution.”8 (Brief, p. 1 8.) In other

words, Hairston

“is

contending the Idaho Constitution

is

broader” and provides greater

protection than the Federal Constitution. (Brief, p.3 n.4,) However, except for providing

information regarding murderers in Idaho under the age 0f 21 (Brief, pp. 1 8-25), and noting

Court

that this

by the United
State V.

is

“free to extend protections under our constitution

States

Supreme Court under the

beyond those granted

federal constitution” (Brief, p.3 n.4) (quoting

Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 748, 760 P.2d 1162

provide any authority 0r argument explaining
interpreted broader than the federal Constitution.

why

(1988)), Hairston has failed to

the Idaho Constitution should be

On that basis

alone, his argument fails.

When a defendant “fai1[s] t0 articulate any basis as to Why [this Court]

should apply

a different standard in Idaho,” constitutional claims are reviewed under the federal

Constitution.

8

Porter, 130 Idaho at 791.

Idaho’s cruel and unusual clause

relevant portion
shall not

is

is

Indeed, the Court Will not address the issue if

embodied

identical t0 the Eighth

in Art.

I,

§

6 of the Idaho Constitution. The

Amendment and

reads follows, “Excessive bail

be required, nor excessive ﬁnes imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments

inﬂicted.”
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argument and authority are not provided
is

t0 support the contention that broader protection

afforded under the Idaho Constitution.

1211 (1997); see also State

V.

State V.

Shame, 129 Idaho 693, 694, 931 P.2d

Crow, 131 Idaho 109, 111-12, 952 P.2d 1245 (1998)

(because the appellant’s brief did not argue for a different interpretation of the Idaho
Constitution and there

was n0

authority cited for a different interpretation, the only issue

properly before the court was the application ofthe United States Constitution). Therefore,

because Hairston has failed t0 provide any argument or authority establishing that “the
uniqueness 0f our

state,

greater protection than

our Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence” provide

What is afforded under the Eighth Amendment,

Idaho 469, 472, 20 P.3d 5 (2001), his claim

State V. Donato, 135

fails.

Presumably, Hairston did not provide such authority or argument because

Court has explained that

its

“analysis 0f Whether a sentence violates Article

the Idaho Constitution], has traditionally tracked the U.S.

Amendment jurisprudence.”

I,

this

Section 6 [0f

Supreme Court’s Eighth

State V. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 599, 261 P.3d 853 (2011).

While the Court discussed Draper’s contention that “in modifying sentences, the Court has
given great weigh to the age 0f a defendant,” the Court recognized consideration of a
defendant’s age

sentence

was

was a matter of discretion, “not a

unconstitutional.”

I_d.

at

Consequently, the Court simply relied upon

876.

federal constitutional analysis to conclude there

The same

is

was n0

state constitutional Violation.

Li

While he has provided information regarding

true in Hairston’s case.

the imposition of the death penalty in Idaho

facts regarding the various cases,

categorical determination 0f Whether the

0n murderers under 21, and provided limited

he has provided no authority for the proposition that a

county’s failure t0 impose the death penalty
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somehow

establishes a national or state

consensus that evolving standards 0f decency bar imposition 0f the death penalty for
murderers that are between 18 and 2 1. Moreover, the information provided by Hairston

of limited,

if any,

value because the death penalty can

year-old murderers in each county.

still

be imposed against 18

In other words, there have been

no

is

to 21

legislative

enactments 0r judicial decisions barring imposition 0f the death penalty in any Idaho
county.

Rather, prosecutors have exercised their discretion, like any other ﬁrst-degree

murder case, and decided that the death penalty is not warranted
has provided n0 authority for the proposition

that,

in speciﬁc cases. Hairston

because individual county prosecutors

exercised their discretion and declined t0 seek the death penalty, the death penalty as
applied to 18 to 21 year-olds

is

Indeed, challenges to a prosecutor’s

unconstitutional.

exercise 0f discretion have been routinely rejected

Da_vis,

2016

WL 4398378, *24-25 (N.D. Tex.

89 (Miss. 2017); Moeller

V.

(citing State V. Greer,

State V.

e.g.

Rockwell

V.

227 So.3d 963, 988-

14-18 (SD. 2004); State

V.

Greer, 160

883, 891 (Ohio 1988)

530 N.E.2d 382, 396-97 (Ohio 1988)).
facts regarding

540), he has asserted only one that involved a

present.

1,

See

V. State,

Van Hook, 530 N.E.2d

While Hairston has provided limited

was

the courts.

2016); Hutto

Weber, 689 N.W.2d

S.W.3d 750, 783 (Tenn. 2001);

by

murder Where a

(Brief, p.23) (citing State V. Meister,

(2009)) (noting the defendant

was found

some 0f the

statutory aggravating factor

148 Idaho 236, 238, 220 P.3d 1055

guilty 0f committing a

a statutory aggravating factor under I.C. §

cases (R., pp.346-

19-2515(9)(d)).9

murder

for hire,

which

Moreover, there

is

is

n0

9

The state notes the district court found there was a statutory aggravator in State V.
Thurman. (R., pp.516-18.) However, in that same case, the defendant’s age was not even
advanced as mitigation, although the court mentioned it as such, but properly recognized,
“Age, in and of itself, does not preclude imposition 0f the death penalty, but, in this case,
it is

a signiﬁcant factor

when considered

together With other factors.” (R., pp.515, 519.)
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way

conceivable

t0 ascertain

what mitigating evidence was available

weighted the prosecutor’s decision.
information he provides

long ago reasoned

is

is

that

may have

Hairston’s argument and the limited

Indeed,

more akin t0 proportionality

analysis,

not constitutionally required. See Pulley

Which the Supreme Court
465 U.S. 37, 48-

V. Harris,

5 1 (1984). Additionally, the Idaho Legislature eliminated proportionality review of death

sentences in 1994. 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch.127, §
904, 918, 908 P.2d 1211 (1995) (“The legislature's
that this

1;

see also State

V. Fields,

127 Idaho

amendment eliminated the requirement

Court conduct a proportionality review”).

In short, the information Hairston has provided affects neither the national

consensus regarding imposition of the death penalty nor has any bearing on whether
Idaho’s constitution bars imposition of the death penalty for murderers between 18 and 2 1.

G.

The

District

Court Applied The Correct Legal Standards

Finally, Hairston contends the district court “applied the

because
t0 seek

“[i]t

employed

test t0 the

presumption in favor of the’ State under which

it

was

claim”

‘obligated

an interpretation’ that foreclosed the aggrieved party’s claims.” (Brief, pp.25-26)

(quoting R., p.778).

used in

‘a

wrong

M,

However, the

149 Idaho

at

district court

employed the same standard

this

Court

40 (2010), where the defendant raised questions of statutory

construction as well as the state and federal constitutionality 0f I.C. § 19-2719 in a

successive post-conviction petition.

The Court explained

that “[b]oth constitutional

questions and questions 0f statutory interpretations are questions of law over which this

Court exercises free review.”

Li.

The Court

From the information provided by Hairston,
the death penalty

also reafﬁrmed, “There

in only

one case did the

was not appropriate because of the defendant’s

33

is

a presumption in

district court

conclude

age. (R., p.425.)

favor of the constitutionality of the challenged statute or regulation, and the burden 0f

establishing that the statute 0r regulation

appellate court

is

constitutionality.”

is

unconstitutional rests

upon the

challengers.

obligated t0 seek an interpretation 0f a statute that upholds

Li. (quoting

Am.

Falls Reservoir Dist.

m, 143 Idaho 862, 869, 154 P.3d 433 (2007)).

In

No. 2

m,

V.

An
its

Idaho Dep’t of Water

151 Idaho at 598, this Court

reafﬁrmed, “The requirements of the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions are questions of law,
over which this Court exercises free review.”

While
is

true that Hairston is not challenging the constitutionality

it is

0f a

statute,

he

contending that under the federal and Idaho constitutions 18 t0 21 year-old murderers

cannot be sentenced to death. That

one

that is

statute

is still

his burden,

one

that

he has failed t0 meet, and

governed by the same standards as those involving the constitutionality of a

because he

is

contending that the

state

and federal constitutions do not permit the

imposition of the death penalty involving 18 to 21 year—old murderers.

he

is

asking this Court to interpret the state and federal constitutions t0 prohibit the

imposition ofthe death penalty for 18 to 21 year—old murderers, Which
this

In other words,

is

the

same as having

Court interpret whether a statute permits the execution 0f such murderers. Therefore,

the district court did not apply an incorrect standard.

Irrespective, for all the reasons stated above, Hairston has not

establishing he

is

the evidence.

Even

entitled to post-conviction relief

if this

even

if the

burden

is

met

his

preponderance of

Court has authority t0 determine what constitutes national

evolving standards 0f decency, there

is,

as explained above,

no national consensus

imposition 0fthe death penalty for 18 to 21 year-olds. Moreover, because this

0f law that

is

burden of

is

that bars

a question

subj ect to free review, even if the district court applied an incorrect standard
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0r otherwise erred,

remand

is

unnecessary. See State V. Sepulveda, 161 Idaho 79, 82, 383

P.3d 1249 (2016) (quotes and citations omitted) (“Sepulveda’s claims are constitutionally
based.

this

The

requires 0f the Idaho and U.S. Constittuion are questions 0f law, over

Court has free review”);

Muchow V.

State,

142 Idaho 401, 402, 128 P.3d 938 (2006)

(quotes and citations omitted) (“On appeal 0f a

conviction

relief,

summary

this court exercises free

its

application

review”); see also Rhoades

particularly unavailing.

it is

“Where an

V. State,

remand

Hairston’s additional request t0

question 0f law,

dismissal of petition for post-

appellate courts exercise free review over questions 0f law.

determination of the meaning 0f a statute and

1066 (2009).

Which

is

The

a matter of law over which

148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d

for an evidentiary hearing is

application for post—conviction relief raises only

on the pleadings.” Matthews

suitable for disposition

V. State,

113

Idaho 83, 84, 741 P.2d 370 (Ct. App. 1987). Moreover, “Where the evidentiary facts are
not disputed and the

is

trial

court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact,

summary judgment

appropriate, despite the possibility 0f conﬂicting inferences because the court alone Will

be responsible for resolving the conﬂict between those inferences.” Rhoades, 148 Idaho
at

250 (quotes,

citations,

may not have been

and brackets omitted). In

disputed, the district court

conﬂicting inferences from those

facts.

was

Simply

this case,

while the evidentiary facts

clearly permitted t0 resolve

stated, the facts alleged

any alleged

by Hairston did

not establish that either the federal or state constitutions bar imposition of the death penalty
in his case.

Finally, Hairston’s contention that this Court should

“new evidence
While

it is

in support

of a national consensus”

is

remand

without authority and meritless.

true that Hairston cited Herra V. Estay, 146 Idaho 674, 68 1
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for consideration 0f

,

201 P.3d 647 (2009)

appearance of “newly discovered”

to support his suggestion, that case did not involve the

evidence, but

was a

When

negligence

situation

Where the

district court failed t0

summary judgment.

granting

There

is

address a second theory of

no authority for the bold

proposition that, in a capital successive post-conviction case, this Court can merely remand
for reconsideration in light

contours of LC. § 19-2719.

Idaho

at

0f newly discovered evidence, particularly under the

On that basis, his argument must be rejected.

725. Irrespective, the state has explained

why

this

See

strict

m,

146

“newly discovered” evidence

hardly warrants ﬁnding that 18 t0 21 year-olds are not subject t0 the death penalty.

H.

Summagy
Hairston’s arguments are really nothing

more than an attempt t0 eliminate the death

Indeed, in Allen V. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 952-55

penalty.

attempted to extend the rationale 0f

m m
and

t0

(9th Cir.

murderers

age” and have physical inﬁrmities. Not only did the Ninth Circuit
merits,

Q

at

2006), the petitioner

who

are “advanced in

rej ect

the claim

on the

954-55, but the court refused t0 even grant the petitioner a certiﬁcate 0f

appealability because he failed t0 “demonstrate that reasonable jurists

district court’s

would ﬁnd

assessment 0f the constitutional claims debatable 0r wrong,”

(quoting Slack V. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
In State V. Abdullah,

(9th Cir.

Q

at

the

951

2000)).

158 Idaho 396, 455-56, 348 P.3d

1

(2005), this Court

addressed the constitutionality of the death penalty, and approvingly recognized that
“[w]hatever the arguments
in terms

may be

against capital punishment, both on moral grounds and

of accomplishing the purpose of punishment—and they are forceﬁJI—the death

penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day
accepted,

it

When

it is still

cannot be said t0 Violate the constitutional concept 0f cruelty,”
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Q

Widely
at

456

(quoting

Mp, 356 U.S.

determination

at 99).

by this Court

“Therefore, absent

some

that Idaho’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional

evolving standards 0f decency and public opinion

They

representative bodies.

Li. (quoting

Gregg

V.

legislative 0r executive action, a

are not designed to

unsupported.

is

based on

‘Courts are not

be a good reﬂex of democratic society.”’

Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976)).

These same arguments are applicable
the death penalty to murderers

to Hairston’s attempt to

between 18 and 2 1. Even

if this

expand abolition of

Court had the authority to

conclude that the federal Constitution bars imposition 0f the death penalty against such
murderers, Hairston has failed t0 meet his burden of establishing a national consensus t0
support his argument, particularly since, with a single exception in Kentucky that
appeal,

n0 court

is

on

in the country has extended the abolition to include 18 t0 21 year olds.

III.

T0 Establish The District Court Erred BV Summarilv Dismissing
Claim 2 That Would Extend Miller And Montgomery T0 Murderers Under 21

Hairston Has Failed

Based upon the same alleged “evolving standards 0f decency”
ﬁrst claim, Hairston contends that

m

that

he raises in his

and Montgomery should be extended

murderers between 18 and 21 that have been sentenced t0 death.

(Brief, pp.32-34.)

Because he based his second claim on the same principle argument associated with
claim — “that the eighteen-year cutoff for capital cases
standards of decency”

—

is

to

his ﬁrst

no longer consistent With evolving

the district court recognized the second claim fails “for the

same

reasons” as his ﬁrst claim. (R., pp.783-84.) Likewise, for the same reasons addressed in
the previous section explaining that imposition of the death penalty for murderers

between

not unconstitutional, Hairston has failed t0 meet his burden of establishing

18 and 21

is

that Miller

and Montgomery should be extended
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in the

manner he contends.

In Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, the

forbids a sentencing

scheme
’7

that

Supreme Court held

mandates

Amendment

prison Without the possibility of parole

life in

The Court reasoned

“that the Eighth

“[m]andatory

life

Without parole for a

juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and

its

hallmark features—

for juvenile offenders.

among them,
I_d.

at

477.

immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.”

A mandatory life

home environment
extricate

that

sentence also “prevents taking into account the family and

that surrounds [the

himself—no matter how

juvenile]—and from which he cannot usually

brutal or dysfunctional,” “neglects the circumstances

the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the

familial

and peer pressures

may have

of

way

affected him,” and “ignores that [the juvenile] might

have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense

if

not for incompetencies associated

with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police ofﬁcers 0r prosecutors (including

0n a plea agreement) 0r

his incapacity to assist his

own

attorneys.” Li.

“And

ﬁnally, this

mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even When the
circumstances most suggest

Relying upon

m

it.”

Li.

and Graham, the Court recognized

it

had established

“that

children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing because they

“have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform.”
determined

its

prior decisions “rested not only

knows—but 0n science and

on

common

social science as well.” Li. (quotes

Court also focused upon penological justiﬁcations.
determined that “the mandatory penalty schemes

at

471.

The Court

sense—on what any parent

and

Li. at 472.

at issue

Li

citations omitted).

The

Ultimately, the Court

here prevent the sentencer from

taking account of these central considerations” and “prohibit a sentencing authority from
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assessing whether the law’s harshest term 0f imprisonment proportionality punishes a

juvenile offender.”

at

474.

Montgomery, 136

In

new

I_d.

“Whether Miller adopts a

S.Ct. at 727, the Court considered

substantive rule that applies retroactively on collateral review t0 people

as juveniles t0 die in prison.”

Without parole

law” since

is

“it

The Court held

retroactive because “Miller

rendered

life

framed

M’s

of youth.”

Windom V.

In

the issue in

determined,

Li. at

appears that

Whose crimes reﬂect

juvenile offenders

life

citations omitted).

without parole

.

far

more than whether

Montgomery declared

The Court

m

that Miller

this

Court concluded

applied retroactively, and

was

retroactive not only for

imposed a ﬁxed-life sentence without considering the

However, n0 court has expanded Miller 0r Montgomery

---,

that

2019

0f

whom

distinctive

of youth.”

attributes

and 21

also

incorrigibility.” Li.

those juveniles sentenced t0 a mandatory 0f life Without parole, but also for those for
the sentencing court

the

for all but the rarest

.

.

162 Idaho 417, 423, 398 P.3d 150 (2017),

Montgomery involved
“it

is

Whose crimes reﬂect permanent

State,

life

announced a substantive rule 0f constitutional

734 (quotes and

prohibition as “bar[ring]

juvenile offenders, those

on mandatory

without parole an unconstitutional penalty for a class 0f

defendants because of their status—that
transient immaturity

that Miller’s prohibition

condemned

have also been sentenced

WL 2718457

(Ill.

Ct.

t0 death. Hairston cites

m,

it

murderers between 18

People

V.

House,

---

N.E.2d

App. 2019), contending Montgomery was extended from

defendants under eighteen t0 defendants under nineteen. That

examined

to

never even cited Montgomegy.

More

is

incorrect.

While

m

importantly, the question

was

decided based upon an “as applied challenge” under the proportionate penalties clause 0f

39

the Illinois Constitution

(Ill.

Const. 1970,

art. 1, § 11).

at

I_d.

**6-14. The court expressly

declined t0 address the defendant’s original arguments regarding a facial challenge under
the Eighth

Amendment.

I_d.

at

** 14, 16.

More

rejected the argument that scientiﬁc research

adults warrants an expansion of Miller.

importantly, the Illinois

Supreme Court has

0n the neurological development of young

People

V. Harris,

120 N.E.3d 900, 913-14

(Ill.

2018). Discussing Roper, Graham, and Miller, the court recognized,

drawn by the Supreme Court at age 18 was not based primarily on
The Supreme Court recognized its line at age 18 was an
imprecise categorical rule but emphasized that a line must be drawn. The
Court drew the line at age 18 because that is the point where society draws
the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. New research
ﬁndings d0 not necessarily alter that traditional line between adults and
the line

scientiﬁc research.

juveniles.

Li. (quotes, citations,

and brackets omitted).

directed the lower court in

People

V.

House

House, 111 N.E.3d 940

The

state also

life

to vacate its decision

(Ill.

Illinois

Supreme Court

and reconsider based upon Harris.

2018).

acknowledges that in Cruz, 2018

federal district judge in the

mandatory ﬁxed

Consequently, the

Second Circuit opined

WL

1541898, **14-25, a lone

that Miller should

be extended t0

sentences for defendants under 19. In doing so, the judge speciﬁcally

rejected the analysis of every court that

had determined Miller should not be extended,

concluding those courts did not have the scientiﬁc evidence that was presented t0 the judge,
or simply concluding those other opinions were merely persuasive authority and that
the court’s “duty t0 decide this case

While the

0n the law and record before

state certainly recognizes courts

record that are presented,

When every other

it is

court has

have a duty

difﬁcult to envision

rej ected

how

was

court”. Li. at *16.

to decide cases

0n the law and

there can be a national consensus

an extension 0f Miller.
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[that]

it

More

importantly, just last

month

the

Second Circuit rejected the notion

that,

merely because “scientiﬁc research purportedly shows that the biological factors that
reduce children’s moral culpability likewise affect individuals through their early 20’s,”
Miller and

Montgomery should be extended beyond the age of 18. U.S.

95, 97 (2nd Cir. 2019).

that

drawing the

The court explained

line at 18 years

0f age

is

that the

V. Sierra,

933 F.3d

Supreme Court “has acknowledged

subj ect, 0f course, to the objections always raised

against categorical rules, such that the qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do

not disappear

when an individual turns

already attained a level 0f maturity

some

and brackets omitted). “Nevertheless, a
repeatedly chosen in the Eighth

which

is

the point

and that by the same token, some under 18 have

18,

adults Will never reach.”

(quOtes, citations,

must be drawn, and the Supreme Court has

line

Amendment

Where society draws the

I_d.

context t0 draw that line at the age of 18,

line for

many purposes between

childhood and

adulthood.” Li. (quotes and citation omitted).

Other courts have also expressly 0r implicitly
should not be extended.

4278977, *2

(MD.

See

e.g.

Hernandez

V.

rej ected

w, and concluded

m

Superintendent 0f Sci-Dallas, 2019

WL

Penn. 2019) (quotes and citation omitted) (rejecting Cruz and

concluding, “courts in this circuit have consistently declined t0 extend Miller t0 convicted
offenders

Who were

eighteen at the time they committed the offense for Which they were

WL 4247629,

*5-6 (rejecting Cruz, and concluding, “Miller

convicted”); Farmer,

2019

plainly stated that

ruling applied t0 juveniles under the age 0f eighteen”); Burgie V.

State,

its

575 S.W.3d 127, 128 (Ark. 2019) (noting Cruz, but recognizing, “The United States

Supreme Court has not extended

its

holdings to offenders that were eighteen

crime was committed, and federal courts that have addressed
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this issue

when

the

have soundly

rejected the application of the reasoning in Miller and

petitioners

People

V.

Graham

to claims raised

Who were eighteen or older When their crimes were committed”)

Sanchez, 63 Misc. 3d 938, 944-46

(S. Ct.

(citing cases);

N. Y. County, 2019) (rejecting

and concluding “while the choice 0f age 18 as the demarcation for mandatory
sentences has obviously been informed
the line has been

As with

drawn

is

by brain development

even

if this

LWOP

research, the precise place

Court had the authority t0 conclude that the

federal Constitution warrants an expansion 0f

that

w

based 0n law and policy considerations, not science”).

his ﬁrst claim,

between 18 and 21

by

m

and Montgomery

to murderers

have been sentenced t0 death, Hairston has failed t0 meet his burden

0f establishing a national consensus t0 support his argument, particularly since no court in
the country has extended the restrictions t0 include 18 t0 21 year olds, let alone those that

have been sentenced

t0 death.

Simply

stated,

under the

state

and federal constitutions,

murderers are not “boys,” kids,” or “children” as alleged by Hairston.
Rather, they are adults, subj ect adult penalties, including the death penalty.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests that Hairston’s

that the decision

of the

trial

appeal be dismissed

court be afﬁrmed on appeal.

DATED this 25th day 0f September, 2019.

/s/

L.LaMONT ANDERSON

Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
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0r, alternatively,
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HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 25th day of September, 2019, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below
I

by means 0f iCourt File and Serve:

JONAH J. HORWITZ
FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF IDAHO
Jonah_Horwitz@fd.org

/s/

L.

LaMONT ANDERSON

Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
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